A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence by Pruitt, Lisa R.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 16 Issue 2 Article 1 
1994 
A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence 
Lisa R. Pruitt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 183 (1994). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
A SURVEY OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Lisa R. Pruitt*
"Feminist scholarship makes sense only in the context of an over-
whelmingly sexist science."
Margit Eichler
The Double Standard: A Feminist
Critique of Feminist Social Science (1980)
One of the earliest recorded uses of "feminist jurisprudence"
was at a 1978 Harvard Law School celebration commemorating the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the institution's first women graduates.'
A panel of judges, lawyers, and legal educators at that event debated
the most basic of questions regarding the enterprise: Was there in
existence or should there be developed a feminist jurisprudence?
Apparently the consensus reply to both queries was then no, perhaps
in part because the label invoked images of political cries for special
legal treatment for women. 2
In spite of that early rejection of the project's "packaging"
and imperative, a feminist jurisprudence-both movement and dis-
* B.A. summa cum laude (1986), J.D. high honors (1989) University of
Arkansas, Fayetteville; Candidate for Ph.D, University College, London. The author
is currently a legal assistant to Judge George Aldrich at the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, The Hague, Netherlands. She is a former law clerk to the Honorable
Morris Sheppard Arnold of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. Carol Smart asserts that feminist jurisprudence originated in the nineteenth
century, even though such a concept was not recognized by the feminists of that
era. Women's movements then had their grounding in the liberal philosophy of
equal rights, protesting material restrictions upon women such as bars to educational
and political opportunities. See Carol Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, in SUPPLE-
MENTARY JUSTICE (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1990) [hereinafter Smart, Feminist Juris-
prudence].
2. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 191, 193 (1989) [hereinafter Cain, Grounding the Theories]
(attributing to Professor Ann Scales, then a Harvard law student, who moderated
the debate); Ann C. Scales, Towards a New Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J.
375 (1981) [hereinafter Scales, New Feminist Jurisprudence]. See also Kathleen A.
Lahey, ... Until Women Themselves Have Told All They Have to Tell ... . 23
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 519, 520, 524 (1985) [hereinafter Lahey, Until Women Them-
selves] (quoting MARGrr EICHLER, THE DOUBLE STANDARD: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE
oF FEMINIST SOCIAL SCIENCE (1980) (noting the argument against feminist legal
theory that it is not really scholarship because it is too overtly political to be
anything other than polemic).
Although I am uncertain about all the reasons why this particular panel at
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cipline in one-has emerged. 3 It is at once a critique within legal
scholarship and education and a challenge to the structure of those
institutions.4 To call it a movement is to acknowledge that it adopts
an admitted and self-consciously critical stance toward orthodox
jurisprudence and is focused upon the common goals of raising the
law's awareness and understanding of, as well as its responsiveness
to, women as women.
To label it as a discipline, however, is not to imply that it is
organized around a single theory.' Consistent with feminist goals in
other contexts, much feminist jurisprudence avoids "theory" alto-
gether, choosing instead to focus upon the practical reality of wom-
en's experiences and concerns. In fact, one of the only remaining
unifying themes of feminist jurisprudence-yet still one about which
different strands vary as to its centrality and importance-is that
women's experience must be revealed and communicated. 6 The wom-
en's "truths ' 7 revealed in turn provide a stance from which one
Harvard rejected the need for a feminist jurisprudence, British sociologist Carol
Smart has articulated her own reason for rejecting the concept. She asserts that
any search for feminist vision that can help reform the law is idealized, noting
that only when the "central role of law as an organizing principle of everyday
life is . . . challenged" can we rebut the assumed need for some form of juris-
prudence. See Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 17.
3. Interestingly, as recently as two or three years ago, some denied that a
feminist jurisprudence had yet developed, preferring to refer to it as "feminist
legal theory." See, e.g., Cain, Grounding the Theories, supra note 2, at 194 n.12;
Adrian Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited: Towards a Feminist Theory of Social
Justice, 15 INT'L J. oF Soc. oF LAw 423, 428 (1987) [hereinafter Howe, 'Social
Injury' Revisited]; Christine A. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence,
10 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Search]; Jenny Morgan,
Feminist Theory as Legal Theory, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 743 (1988) [hereinafter
Morgan, Feminist Theory as Legal Theory]. Other less recent admissions of the
struggle to develop this area include Catharine MacKinnon, Panel Discussion,
"Developing Feminist Jurisprudence," at the 14th National Conference on Women
and Law, Washington, D.C. (April 9, 1983), quoted in Heather Ruth Wishik, To
Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 64 (1986) [hereinafter Wishik, To Question Everything]; Scales, New Feminist
Jurisprudence, supra note 2.
4. Littleton, Search, supra note 3, at 2.
5. See generally John Shotter & Josephine Logan, The Pervasiveness of Pa-
triarchy: On Finding a Different Voice, in FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE
OF KNOWLEDGE (Mary McCanney Gergen ed., 1988) (questioning whether a distinctly
feminist practice or comprehensive mode of thought can exist in our patriarchal
culture).
Although feminist jurisprudence generally is not centered on one theory, some
individual strands of it represent meta-narrative, such as MacKinnon's brand of
radical feminism. See infra text accompanying notes 75-93.
6. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text (discussing methodology and
epistemology); accord Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617, 621 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Critical Theories].
7. It is important to note that many feminist legal theorists reject the potentiality
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can, and a basis upon which one may, critique the method, procedure,
and substance of the law, offering both supplementation and cor-
rection. Feminist legal scholars frequently write in reformist terms-
"of challenging, subverting, or transforming legal relations at their
core." 8 They question vested interests, uproot familiar and com-
fortable perspectives, and defy the status quo. 9 They are suspect of
the highly structured nature of legal method, the form and patterns
of legal inquiry and decision-making, and legal "ways of knowing."' 0
As feminist jurisprudence has developed in the last decade, the
label has continued to be somewhat problematic. It has been referred
to as an "oxymoron"" and a "conceptual anomaly ' 1 2 and likened
to "a modern quest for the Holy Grail."'' 3 The common theme of
these commentators-most of whom are not hostile to the movement/
discipline-is that the traditional, dominant jurisprudence is so mas-
culine that any feminist perspective on it is inaccurate or, at best,
strictly marginalized in the current patriarchal society.' 4 Some carry
of discovering any single unifying "women's" truth, although they believe that
each individual woman may discover her own truth through methods such as
consciousness-raising. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
One of the paradoxes of feminist jurisprudence is reflected here: the conflict of
individuality of experience among women with the search for a unifying experience
from which we can formulate an agenda for legal change.
8. Littleton, Search, supra note 3, at 2.
9. See generally Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The
Difference it Makes, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 147 (1987) [hereinafter Mossman,
Feminism and Legal Method] (quoting A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY:
THE DEFEERENCE IT MAKES (E. Langland and W. Gove eds., 1981)).
10. See id. at 149, 167; see generally Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
103 HAv. L. REv. 829 (1990) [hereinafter Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods]; Cain,
Grounding the Theories, supra note 2; Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra
note 2, at 527; Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism Law, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 254 (1992) (hereinafter Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism]; A. W. Phinney
III, Feminism, Epistemology and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen v. Gilliard,
12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (1989).
11. Ann C. Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence
as Oxymoron?, 12 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 25 (1989).
12. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988)
[hereinafter West, Jurisprudence and Gender].
13. Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 17 (citing CAROL SMART,
FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989)). As Moira Gatens has written in a
theoretical context, "there cannot be an unadulterated feminist theory which would
announce our arrival at a place where we could say we are 'beyond' patriarchal
theory and patriarchal experience." Moira Gatens, Feminism, Philosophy and Rid-
dles Without Answers, in FEMINIST CHALLENGES 26 (C. Pateman & E. Gross eds.,
1986).
14. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has asserted that the female cannot
articulate her own definitions, goals or thoughts "because his foot is on her throat."
Ellen C. DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Valtes, and the Law-A Con-
1994]
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the argument a step further, asserting that the establishment or
endorsement of any form of jurisprudence is antithetical to feminism
and that feminists should be challenging the "central role of law
as an organizing principle in everyday life.' ' 5
My 6 discomfort with (but not outright rejection of) the "feminist
jurisprudence" label stems from somewhat different concerns. In
essence, I believe it may no longer accurately reflect the nature of
the project-or at least what I believe the project should be and
do. First, it evokes images of an "us-them" mentality, which con-
tributes to the misunderstanding and defeat of the enterprise, as
well as to the continued isolation of women. Just as it defines, it
also marginalizes. Secondly, I agree with Katharine Bartlett, who
has asserted that use of the "feminist" label provokes assumptions
of a standard woman; it is a "fixed, exclusionary, homogenizing,
and oppositional" term-one embracing an essentialism that feminists
versation, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 11, 74 (1985) [hereinafter DuBois et al., Feminist
Discourse, A Conversation] (emphasis added). See also Mossman, Feminism and
Legal Method, supra note 9, at 148-49 (questioning the extent to which feminist
theory can impact the structure of legal inquiry); Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory
of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 83, 84 (1980) (noting that because
law plays a "primary and significant role in social order" it is powerful as both
a "symbol and vehicle for male authority"); West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
supra note 12, at 4 (explaining that feminists take women's humanity seriously,
but jurisprudence and law do not, and until this changes "feminist jurisprudence"
is a political impossibility). But see Cain, Grounding the Theories, supra note 2,
at 193-94 (asserting that women who have at some point rebelled against patriarchy
have experienced at least "glimpses" of their own authenticity).
15. See Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 17. Smart also criticizes
the point at which "feminist jurisprudence becomes almost a messianic movement
and [where] notions of the limits of the ability of law (whether feminist or not)
to transform social reality are forgotten." Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra
note 1, at 19.
Most recently, commentators have begun to state this critique in political phi-
losophy parlance: Feminists must bypass the modernist perspective of law-a system
employing concepts of objectivity, truth, and reason-and embrace the post-modern
perspective, with its themes of practice, critique, and localism. See Patterson,
Postmodernism/Feminism, supra note 10.
16. My use of the first person throughout this article is purposeful. One important
aspect of the feminist critique of law (as well as of the Critical Legal Studies
movement) has been the expressed doubt of law's purported objectivity and an
emphasis on feminist methodology. Such methodology admits the subjective, personal
perspective. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The
Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
886, 886-87 (1989) [hereinafter Finley, Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning]. Kath-
leen Lahey has commented on dominant ideology's "condemnation of feminist
'subjectivity' or 'polemic'," noting that its "privileged stance of (universalist) male
scholars gives them the authority to declare other scholars to be deficient in some
crucial quality." Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra note 2, at 526.
[Vol. 16:183
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have criticized in dominant jurisprudence. 7 Women of color, for
example, have objected vigorously to such essentialism, decrying
white, middle-class feminism's attempt to set a single standard, to
state a single description of, and agenda for, all women. 8
Moreover, because much of the current feminist jurisprudence
posits a gender-oriented rather than sex-oriented analysis, it tends
to perpetuate stereotypes-sometimes harmful ones-about the nature
of women. This reinforces identification of women, or at least of
the "feminine," with certain characteristics and traits, an identifi-
cation that, even if currently an accurate description, in the long
run limits choices and possibilities for both women and men. Some
scholars, perhaps sharing early reservations about embracing the
"feminist" label, have begun to speak simply of gender and gendered
analyses.' 9 I, however, am doubtful that this alternate label truly
resolves the problem. While it is more politically palatable to many,
it still implicitly adopts gender rather than sex, which (usually)
determines gender, as the primary (and sometimes essential) category
for analysis. It plays off of a feminine-masculine dichotomy, thereby
representing the very sort of dualism rejected by many feminist
scholars .2
The substance of the project is, at any rate, at least as important
17. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 834; Patterson, Post-
modernism/Feminism, supra note 10.
18. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and An-
archist Politics, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 57
(Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991); Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS
IN LAW AND GENDER 235 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991);
Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
115 (1989); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989); Rhode,
Critical Theories, supra note 6.
19. See generally, e.g., RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18; West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender,
87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
20. See Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism, supra note 10.
Labelling may, at the outset, seem an insignificant issue. Leslie Bender has
opined, however, that labels are divisive and cause ideas to "become fixed instead
of remaining fluid and growing." Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist
Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5 n.5 (1988); see also Patterson, Post-
modernism/Feminism, supra note 10. At this stage, however, they seem helpful,
perhaps still necessary. And if feminist jurisprudence is able to achieve its goals,
the issue will have been resolved, as the discipline/movement will have integrated




as the name, and I now turn to a brief historical overview of feminist
jurisprudence. Following that, I discuss briefly some of the more
prominent analyses within feminist jurisprudence, seeking to be par-
ticularly critical nor to provide novel insights, but rather to provide
the feminist jurisprudence novice some rudimentary information. I
also attempt to reveal some of the paradoxes within and among
these strains in order to help formulate an agenda about feminist
jurisprudence might best go forward.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Feminist jurisprudence began with an attempt to cure women's
obscurity and even invisibility in the law. This was reflected in the
"women and the law" 21 approach of the 1970s, a strategy that soon
demanded a shift in methodology as it became evident that to "add
women and stir" was inadequate. 22 These attempts were nevertheless
helpful initially, as they drew attention to women and put some of
women's concerns on the political agenda, being particularly in-
strumental in the early development of discrimination doctrine. 23
Carried to its logical conclusions, however, the approach often proved
problematic because as the sameness versus difference and special
treatment versus equal treatment debates evolved, women (along with
what had been labeled "feminine" values) were usually evaluated
by both male (biologically speaking) and masculine (socially speaking)
standards .24
21. See generally, e.g., SUSAN ATKINS AND BRENDA HOGGETT, WOMEN AND THE
LAW (1984); Karen Offen, Feminism and Sexual Difference in Historical Perspective,
in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990);
Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatmnt Deah,,t 13 MVU R 1 L. & SC CL r. 325 (1984).
22. See, e.g., Wishik, To Question Everything, supra note 3, at 67-68 (arguing
that mere inclusion is not the goal of feminist jurisprudence).
23. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 81-107.
24. This dilemma is well reflected in the debate surrounding the quest for
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. From 1972,
when the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed the amendment, until
the 1982 state ratification deadline, the campaigns for and against ratification often
focused upon gender difference rather than upon gender disadvantage/hierarchy,
conferring more importance upon formal rights than upon cultural context. See
generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 63-80, 306-07.
See also, e.g., ELIZABETH WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980);
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Faulty Framework: Consequences of the Difference Model
for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 309 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex
Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Catharine MacKinnon,
[Vol. 16:183
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The next wave of feminist analyses sought to overcome these
limitations by shifting epistemological and methodological focus.
Feminists found themselves unable to ignore methodology, having
learned that challenging existing power structures with the same
methods that defined those structures risked recreation of different,
but equally illegitimate frameworks. 25 Included in these second-stage
approaches have been relational or cultural feminism's "celebration
of difference," 26 radical feminism's gendered hierarchy/dominance
framework, 27 and the public-private (market-family) dichotomy. 28 Other
less prominent analyses have included variations on and even com-
Excerpts from MacKinnon/Schlafly Debate, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 341-42 (1983);
Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 634-35 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider,
Dialectic of Rights and Politics]; Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982).
25. See Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10.
26. See generally, e.g., CAROL GLLIOAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter
GILUIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice]; Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 543 (1986); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12.
27. See generally, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE] (constructing a
theory of gender hierarchy and dominance); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON Ln AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEM-
INISM UNMODIFIED]; RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 1-6, 81-86,
305-21 (specifically preferring the term "gender disadvantage" to MacKinnon's
"gender dominance"). See also Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Pos-
tructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1129 (1987) (hereinafter
Ashe, Mind's Opportunity].
28. See generally, e.g., KATHERINE O'DoNovAN, SEXUAL DrvisioNs IN LAW (1985);
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989) [hereinafter OKIN,
GENDER AND FAMILY]; Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider, Perspectives on
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE PoLrIcs OF LAW: A PRO-
OESSrvE CRITIQUE 117 (David Kairys ed., 1982); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT (1988); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and
the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Dowd, Work and Family]; Elizabeth
Fox-Genovese, The Legal Status of Families, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 992 (1992); Jane
E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
997 (1992); Francis Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983) [hereinafter Olsen, Family and Market].
See also SUSAN ATKINS AND BRENDA HOGGETT, WOMEN AND THE LAW 101-23(1984); MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED (1988); Regina Graycar, Hoovering
as a Hobby: The Common Law's Approach to Work in the Home, 28 REFRACTORY
Gnu. 22 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983).
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binations of these.2 9 A few merit independent mention, such as Tove
Stang Dahl's "women's law," which incorporates what she calls
realist, experiential method and social science.30 Others include a
social injury approach,3 and a standpoint/positionality approach,
the latter generally advocating consciousness raising and legal nar-
rative or story-telling as method, and focusing on women's experience
to inform solutions.12 The categories are not static, and the doctrinal
combinations are seldom simple. 3
29. One exception might be that stated by Robin West, who asserts that both
radical feminists and cultural feminists implicitly embrace some version of what
she calls a "connection thesis." This thesis is that "[w]omen are actually or
potentially materially connected to other human life [while mien aren't." West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12, at 14. West identifies this in cultural
feminism's emphasis upon women's subjectivity, their value of intimacy, and their
capacity for nurturing and care of "others" to whom they are connected. She
identifies this in radical feminism's focus upon invasion and intrusion of the female
body. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12 at 15.
Furthermore, some commentators have found merit in both systems of thought,
finding them not necessarily to be mutually exclusive. Jenny Morgan has written
that both Gilligan and MacKinnon are correct-the former because theory about
women's different approaches to problem solving validates the feelings many women
have had about legal education and practice, and the latter because Morgan doubts
that women are inherently different in their approaches to decision making and is
skeptical that women would embrace such an ethic of caring if they really had a
choice. See Morgan, Feminist Theory as Legal Theory, supra note 3.
30. See generally TovE STANG DAHL, WOMEN'S LAw-AN INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Craig trans., 1987) [hereinafter DAHL, WOMEN'S
LAW]; Tove Stang Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point: Building Women's
Law, f4 INT'L J. OF Soc. OF LAW 239 (1986) [hereinafter Dahl, Taking Women
as a Starting Point] (addressing feminist perspectives within the tradition of black
letter law). See also Agnete Weis Bentzon, Comments on Women's Law in Scan-
dinavia, 14 INT'L J. OF Soc. OF LAW 249 (1986); Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence,
supra note 1, at I (commenting upon Dahl's work).
31 See generally Howe, 'Social "-" A% , ..:,^ supra .... 3; 1" Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Considering the Victim's Story].
32. See generally MARTR MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AERiCcAN LAW (1990); Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra
note 10; Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1987); Patterson, Postmod-
ernism/Feminism, supra note 10.
33. An example of the complimentary nature of these various theories and
analyses can be seen in Catharine MacKinnon's work. Although I categorize her
as a radical feminist (as she herself does), she claims consciousness-raising as her
methodological and epistemological approach, see infra notes 102-09, and she
discusses the import of the public-private dichotomy's functioning in law, see infra




II. WOMEN AND THE LAW
Most early (c. pre-1980) writing about law's treatment of and
attitudes toward women falls loosely within this category. Such
writings usually addressed matters traditionally considered "women's
issues," including rape, reproductive rights, and workplace discrim-
ination. By this time, most "formal" barriers to women's political
and professional participation had been dismantled, but situations
unique to women-most related to their biological nature-still ap-
pealed for legal understanding and action. The U.S. Supreme Court
had not, and still has not, accepted gender as a "suspect classifi-
cation," thus failing to accord women the same degree of protection
against discrimination that it has provided other groups that are
vulnerable on the basis of their race, religion or national origin.3 4
As women continued to experience harassment, disparate treatment,
and unequal opportunities in different contexts-discrimination in
forms for which the law provided no redress-they began to look
for new solutions. Once again, an early strategy was to raise women's
visibility, 3 to draw attention to their situations which, all too fre-
quently, evinced their economic, social and even physical plight.
These activists did enjoy some successes. For example, even
though Roe v. Wade,36 the 1973 abortion rights decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court, spoke in terms of the right of privacy rather than
recognizing women's reproductive freedom, it was nevertheless a
victory for women. Other achievements came in the area of rape
law reform. Marital immunity from rape prosecution was abolished
in some states, 37 and rape shield laws were adopted to suppress the
salacious and irrelevant innuendo in rape trials.38
Also contributing to the debate in the United States was the
1972 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passage of the Equal
Rights Amendment and the ensuing ratification contests in the in-
dividual states. Discussion and campaigns ultimately focused on
34. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 713-31 (2d
ed. 1983).
35. The phrase "once again" is appropriate here because this task had already
been accomplished, if only temporarily and partially, during the suffrage movement
of the early twentieth century. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra
note 18, at 12-28.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See generally SUSAN EsTRIcn, REAL RAPE, 72-79 (1987) [hereinafter ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE]; DIANNA RUSSELL, RAPE N MARRIAGE, ch. 2 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE].
38. See generally ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 37, at 57, 88.
1994]
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whether a formal prohibition against gender classifications would in
fact improve women's legal status and lives. With these issues high
on the political agenda and dominant in the media through the
1970s, it was not surprising that some legal scholars continued to
seek legal solutions to women's problems. Nor was it surprising that
the preferential-versus-equal treatment and sameness-versus-difference
debates soon dominated the discussion. 39
III. CULTURAL/RELATIONAL FEMINISM
The same decade that saw the political activism of liberal fem-
inists advocating equality within the law also, paradoxically, saw
feminist academics in other disciplines rediscover and focus upon
the differences between men and women. 40 The germinal work
grounding what has become known as relational or cultural feminism
is Carol Gilligan's 1982 book, In a Different Voice. Based on her
research in developmental psychology, Gilligan posited that, contrary
to previous studies, females are not inferior to males with regard
to development of their moral decision-making faculties.4 1 In the
"feminine" decision-making process, Gilligan identified a "different
voice"-a voice grounded in a "standard of relationship, an ethic
of nurturance, responsibility, and care." 42 According to Gilligan,
this standard of responsibility manifests itself in a different moral
imperative for women.4 3 In the final analysis, she defines the mas-
culine voice as a rights-based ethic of justice and the feminine as
a relational-oriented ethic of caring. In a sense, Gilligan's work
reflects a "separate but equal" idea; she has not so much advocated
changing or adapting what she labels the "feminine," as she has
a greater appreciation of its value in our society.
While the relational/cultural feminist analysis inspired by Gi-
ligan's work has lent itself more easily to many of the family,
workplace, and discrimination issues, it has provided little insight
about other issues including sexual violence against women. And,
while it might have been considered prescriptive with regard to those
issues where it found direct application, the prescription was usually
that women could, and perhaps should, find happiness and satis-
39. See, e.g., Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10; Wishik, To
Question Everything, supra note 3.
40. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERINO (1978);
DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE ROCKING OF THE CRADLE (1978); GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT
VOICE, supra note 26.
41. See GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 26, at 18-22, 25-40 (referring
to Lawrence Kohlberg's 1958, 1973 and 1981 studies, which had determined girls
inferior to boys in regard to the development of their capacity for moral reasoning
and decision-making).
42. GIL.IGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 26, at 159-60.
43. GI.LIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 26, at 100.
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faction in their present nurturing roles and, essentially, that they
should celebrate their difference, their own accomplishments, and
be content." Society, in turn, should attribute greater value to these
characteristics and roles.
Others adopted Gilligan's view of gender difference and began
to utilize this "feminine" motif as critique of the dominant ideology.
A significant corpus of literature affirming and applying her theory
proliferated in the 1980s, with her masculine-feminine dichotomy 45
finding application in numerous legal contexts. These have included
legal education"s and practice, 47 children's rights, 48 employment dis-
crimination, 49 sexual harassment, 51 mediation,5' legal reasoning, 52 and
even corporate, 5" tort, 5 4 and contract law 55 doctrines.
44. For an excellent critique of Gilligan, see Joan Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); see also Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1565-72 (1991)
[hereinafter Williams, Selfless Women] (discussing Gilligan's description of self-
lessness, which is valorized in women).
45. I use "masculine-feminine" here to indicate socialized gender, although
Gilligan's work actually seems to border on biological determinism, which would
be more accurately reflected in "male-female dichotomy."
46. See Christine M. Wiseman, The Legal Education of Women: From "Treason
Against Nature" to Sounding a "Different Voice, " 74 MARQ. L. REv. 325 (1991);
DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, A Conversation, supra note 14, at 49-57.
47. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 26; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices
in the Law, 42 U. MLAmi L. REV. 29 (1987); see also Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-
Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 853 (1992).
48. Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 15 (1986).
49. Paul Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas after Stotts: A Narrative
on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Dis-
crimination Doctrine, 20 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Note, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Ha-
rassment in the Workplace, 18 Wm. MrrcHELL L. REv. 795 (1992) (discussing the
"reasonable woman" standard in sexual harassment law and men's and women's
differing perceptions of situations).
51. Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems,
2 LAw & INEQ. J. 21 (1984).
52. Finley, Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, supra note 16, at 886.
53. Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory
and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OsrOODE HALL L.J. 543
(1985).
54. Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a
Torts Course, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMNISM 41 (1989).
55. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored




Gilligan's starting point is with where women are, and she does
not specifically address how they got there. Her discussion of female
children's development of an identity that is continuous with their
mothers', as primary caretaker, however, comes very close to en-
dorsing biological determinism as the genesis of this different voice .
6
Others have gone a clear step beyond Gilligan, explicitly drawing
the connection between the caring ethic or sense of connectedness
that women experience and their biological sex. Probably the most
influential of these recently has been Robin West, whose "connection
thesis" holds that "women [but not men] are [actually or potentially
materially] connected to other human life.""17 West bases her thesis
on four points at which, she asserts, women experience actual or
potential connection but men do not: pregnancy, nursing, hetero-
sexual intercourse, and menstruation. 8 From this connection, ac-
cording to West, women's defferent voice develops.
In Gilligan's favor, I acknowledge that she articulated an ap-
pealing-and for many women historically affirming-challenge to
male norms. Joan Williams has written that Gilligan's work should
be understood as simply a status report on female gender ideology,5 9
but others have been highly critical of Gilligan's work. Catharine
MacKinnon is among these critics, noting Gilligan's failure to explain
why women develop this different voice. MacKinnon also fears
women will identify with Gilligan's positively valued feminine ster-
eotype not because it is the "real" her, but because society has
attributed it to her. 60 As another commentator put it, what cultural
and other branches of "difference" feminism celebrate as women's
culture concurrently "encourages women to 'choose' economic mar-
ginalization and celebrate that choice as a badge of virtue." '6'
56. GMLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 26, at 151-74.
57. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12, at 18.
58. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12, at 2-3. West prefers the
label "material explanation," rather than biological determinism, for her connection
thesis. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that some
French cultural feminists support her thesis). She explains the general American
feminist rejection of material explanations on several grounds: (1) material expla-
nations require willingness to engage in speculative inquiry, a willingness to consider
phenomenological explanations, which academics tend to lack; (2) for strategic
reasons, as American feminists have realized that most disadvantages imposed on
women in the work-force and elsewhere derive from the central reality of women's
pregnancy potential. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 12, at 21-22.
59. Williams, Selfless Women, supra note 44, at 1565-66.
60. See DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse, A Conversation, supra note 14, at
74-75.
61. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 19, at 801.
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These latter comments and others similar to them have been
rebutted, to a certain degree, by Carol Smart, another non-lawyer,
who notes that "[a]ll 'knowledge' can be put to reactionary use and
Gilligan's work does not carry a special responsibility in this re-
spect." 62 Smart sees value in Gilligan's identification of an "hierarchy
of moral reasoning" as well as in her recognition of "subjugated
modes" that may be used to challenge the existing dominant ide-
ology. 63 Whatever the merits or empirical sustainability of Gilligan's
study,"4 the feminine voice she portrays is significant for the nor-
mative value that relational feminists have ascribed to it. Feminists
have been attracted by its contextualized reasoning and personalized
fact-finding, believing that these promote greater tolerance for di-
versity and greater respect for the "perspectives of the powerless. ' 65
Smart has recognized that the qualities and characteristics that
are labeled as "male" or "masculine" by Gilligan have elsewhere
been described as "Western, imperialist, or 'white' thinking."6 Sim-
ilarly, Joan Williams has argued Gilligan's appropriation of the
critique of "possessive individualism" as well as of the critique of
traditional Western epistemology.67 Finally, Martha Minow has iden-
tified the parallel between male and Western cultural perceptions of
knowledge.6"
What, then, should be made of Gilligan's seemingly excessive
generalizations about women's characteristics and traits? Not only
did she fail to acknowledge differences that may exist across race,
class, sexuality, and ethnicity bases, 69 but as MacKinnon and others
have noted, she failed to address the economic, cultural, and social
62. Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 14.
63. Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 14.
64. A number of studies have shown results contrary to Gilligan's, and several
scholars in her own discipline, developmental psychology, have criticized her method
and conclusions. See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617, 625 (1990) (citing RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 311-
12); see also Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of
Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597(1983) (arguing Gilligan's exaggeration of the masculine-feminine duality in moral
development).
65. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 849.
66. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 849 (citing SANDRA
HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986)).
67. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 19, at 799-800, 806-09.
68. See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, U. Cm. LEGAL F. 115, 131 (1989).
69. Apparently, she subsequently conducted a similar study with factors such
as race and class constituting the variables. See DuBois et al., Feminist Discourse,
A Conversation, supra note 14, at 76.
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factors that have created the different voice. Perhaps the most
productive response to Gilligan's work is to recognize it for what
she intended it to be: an empirical study documenting the fact that
women may use different criteria and modes of reasoning to make
moral decisions than do men, but that this does not necessarily
make women inferior to men in any way. It is only when Gilligan's
work is projected into a restricting theory that assigns to the "fem-
inine" certain characteristics and to the "masculine" certain other
characteristics that it reinforces potentially unhealthy stereotypes for
both gender categories. Even if one assumes that the caring ethic
has traditionally been womens forte, nothing guarantees that it will
or should continue to be. The use to which some legal scholars
have put Gilligan's theories in the name of feminism may have
accurately claimed a limited historical basis. While a critique of law
that stems from a relational and caring orientation is valid, continuing
to equate that critique with the "feminine" is not only increasingly
outdated, it is also an imprudent and restrictive course for those
concerned with improving the lot of women.
IV. RADICAL FEMINISM
One of the primary distinctions between radical feminists and
relational feminists is that the former are more aware of power
disparities between the sexes. In fact, radical feminists generally
articulate their theories in terms of gendered hierarchies of power
and dominance70 or gender disadvantage 7 consistently eschewing any
pure sameness-difference discussion as unproductive. As Deborah
Rhode has suggested, "[t]he critical issue should not be difference,
but the difference difference makes.' '72 While some writers within
the radical feminist school are more obviously radical (in the typical
sense of the word) than others, the movement itself is radical in
the sense that it consistently rejects the orthodoxy of traditional
jurisprudence on all levels and also because its stance is more overtly
political .71
70. See generally MACKINNON, FEMI IST STATE, supra note 27, at 126-54;
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 27, at 32-45; see also CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, ch. 1 (1988) (similarly espousing a grand theory
based on sexuality; down-playing the differences between women as less significant
than the fact they are women).
71. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 111, 319.
72. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 313.
73. Perhaps this is because radical feminism within jurisprudence/law is grounded
in the writings and theories of the 1960s and 1970s radical feminists outside law.
See, e.g., SHuLAmiTr FiRESTONE, TIi DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970); KATE MrLLETT,
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Catharine MacKinnon, radical feminism's best-known propo-
nent, has called radical feminism the only true feminism-feminism
unmodified.7 4 MacKinnon constructs a grand theory, or meta-nar-
rative, that identifies sex as the core of women's oppression and of
men's power. In her early classic statement analogizing marxism to
feminism, MacKinnon opined that "[s]exuality is to feminism what
work is to marxism: that which is most one's own, yet most taken
away.""v5 As for the relation of biological sex to socialized gender,
MacKinnon sees the former as primary. Gender is essentially the
social construction of sexuality.7
Although MacKinnon advocates consciousness raising7" as the
appropriate method by which women can grasp the "reality of wom-
en's condition from within the perspective of that experience, not
from outside it, "78 she assumes the collective-that is, that all women
have shared the same basic experience. Unlike many other feminists,
SEXUAL POLITICS (1970). Such radical work, mostly outside the legal discipline, has
been carried on in the 1980s by writers such as Andrea Dworkin. See, e.g., ANDREA
DWORKIN, LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE: WRITNGs 1976-1987 (1988); ANDREA DWOR-
KIN, INTERCOURSE (1987). See generally RADICAL VOICES (Renate Klein & Deborah
Steinberg eds., 1989); HESTER EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOUGHT (1984);
POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLmCS OF SEXUALITY (Ann Snitow, et al. eds., 1983);
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT (Laura Lederer ed., 1980).
Although she was almost certainly not the first to posit such, Kate Millett wrote
in 1970 that "a disinterested examination of our system of sexual relationship must
point out that the situation between the sexes now, and throughout history, is ...
a relationship of dominance and subordinance." KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS
24-25 (1970) (emphasis added).
74. See MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 117; MACKINNON,
FEM INSM UNMODIEMD, supra note 27, at 15-16.
75. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 515 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Agenda for
Theory]. This was subsequently modified somewhat, with the following analogy in
MacKinnon's 1989 book:
As work is to marxism, sexuality to feminism is socially constructed yet
constructing, universal as activity yet historically specific, jointly comprised
of matter and mind. As the organized expropriation of the work of some
for the benefit of others defines a class, workers, the organized expro-
priation of the sexuality of some for the use of others defines the sex,
woman.
MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 3.
76. MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 111, 113.
77. Consciousness raising has elsewhere been defined as "seeking insights and
enhanced perspectives through collaborative or interactive engagements with others
based upon personal experience and narrative ... " Bartlett, Feminist Legal Meth-
ods, supra note 10, at 831.
78. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 121; see also MacKinnon,
Agenda for Theory, supra note 75, at 543.
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MacKinnon, in her search for a comprehensive explanation for wom-
en's oppression, risks articulating a false consciousness. She maintains
that those who disagree with her identification of sex as the situs of
oppression do not know "Truth" because they have been unable to
discover it within patriarchal society.79 Accordingly, although she
purports to recognize the significance of other factors, such as race,
class and ethnicity,80 her analysis subordinates these factors, as they
are trumped by her sex-based theory of gender oppression.
MacKinnon argues that law's purported objectivity is male.8 '
Furthermore, she asserts, "[Oibjectivity is the methodological stance
of which objectification is the social process. 8 s2 In turn, sexual ob-
jectification subordinates women. MacKinnon's theory is most easily
and directly applicable in legal contexts such as obscenity, rape, and
reproductive freedom. 3 However, in presenting her work as a meta-
narrative, MacKinnon also suggests its role in explaining women's
inequality in any and all contexts. She explains the big picture thus:
Inequality because of sex defines and situates women as women.
If the sexes were equal, women would not be sexually subjected.
Sexual force would be exceptional, consent to sex could be com-
monly real, and sexually violated women would be believed. If
the sexes were equal, women would not be economically subjected,
their desperation and marginality cultivated, their enforced de-
pendency exploited sexually or economically. Women would have
speech, privacy, authority, respect and more resources than they
have now.
Finally, she asserts that women's equality to men will not be sci-
entifically provable until such proof is no longer necessary.'
Beyond the initial step of identifying inequality as a matter of
dominance and subordination, rather than of sameness and difference,
MacKinnon advocates constant mindfulness of this reality so that it
79. See MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 115-17.
80. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 47-59.
81. Furthermore, she defines "male" as "a social and political concept, not a
biological attribute, having nothing whatever to do with inherency, preexistence,
nature, essence, inevitability, or body as such." MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra
note 27, at 114.
82. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 124.
83. See generally MAcKiNNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 171-83, 195-
214.
84. MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 215 (emphasis added).
85. MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 117.
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may eventually be translated into new doctrinal and jurisprudential
concepts may be achieved. 6 Once women's concrete reality has been
declared, MacKinnon says the next step must be to recognize male
forms of power as they are embodied in legal rights for individuals.
This would apply differently in various legal contexts, but the ultimate
goal would be to "qualify or eliminate . .. powers of men . . . [to]
use, access, possess, and traffic women and children."
MacKinnon's acknowledgement that advancement for women plays
out differently in different contexts is similar to the agenda for research
and change of another "disadvantage" feminist, Deborah Rhode.
Rhode tends to speak in more moderate terms than does MacKinnon, 88
and she does not embrace MacKinnon's grand theory. Indeed, she
eschews such products, calling for "theory without Theory . . . fewer
universal frameworks and more contextual analysis.' 'H On the related
matter of women's experience, Rhode also departs from MacKinnon
in that she recognizes a greater variety of women's lived realities. 90
Like MacKinnon, however, Rhode rejects the sameness-difference
analysis, opting instead for a realistic assessment of how women's
differences may be used against them in legal analysis. Her agenda
for reform resembles MacKinnon's in the sense that she encourages
going beyond declarations of women's equality to look at strategies
for securing women's treatment as equals. 91 "[Alnalysis should turn
on whether legal recognition of gender distinctions is likely to reduce
or reinforce gender disparities in power, status, and economic se-
curity. "92
V. THE PUBLIC-PRiVATE DICHOTOMY
Some commentators have found it useful to analyze the law's
relation to women in terms of the public and private spheres of life.
86. MACKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 243.
87. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 245.
88. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18.
89. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 316; see also Rhode, Critical
Theories, supra note 6, at 619.
90. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 318; Patterson, Postmod-
ernism/Feminism, supra note 10; Rhode, Critical Theories, supra note 6, at 621-
23; see generally ZILAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988);
MARTHA MINOW, MAKNG ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
91. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 319.
92. Rhode, Critical Theories, supra note 6, at 625; compare MAcKINNON, FEM-
INIST STATE, supra note 27.
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Katherine O'Donovan, a leading exponent of this analysis, uses "pub-
lic" and "private" to refer to distinctions between the aspects of life
that are regulated by law and those that are not.Y While observing
that the boundary between these spheres shifts over time, she argues
that the presence of the distinction is significant because it long has
been imbued in legal philosophy and informed legal policy.Y O'Don-
ovan speculates that the distinction between the two, while not totally
static, is unlikely to collapse completely. Nevertheless, she advocates
a union of the two spheres, visualizing such a synthesis as a move
that would free both men and women from having to choose between
them.95
Others have taken a different tack arguing that the public-private
dichotomy is best seen as reflective of the family-market split and is
perfectly synonymous with neither the male-female nor the state-society
dichotomies, even though there is significant overlap among them in
Western culture.9 Accordingly, even if male-female analysis were no
longer associated with the market-family dichotomy, the latter would
continue to exist. This is very troubling for those feminist legal scholars
who object to all dichotomous thinking and who would rather see
these categories transcended. These writers, like O'Donovan, advocate
greater market-family and public-private interrelation, noting that the
structure of each part of the current dichotomy exacerbates the conflict
between them, revealing a paradox of sorts when attempts are made
to resolve that conflict. 97 Nancy Dowd reveals that paradox, stating
that "[r]esolution [of the conflict] depends upon attacking the socially
and culturally constructed gender roles that infuse the highly gendered
work-family structure. Confronting gender issues is essential ....
But it is not enough."9
Dowd advocates elimination of the division of work and family
responsibilities on the basis of sex, but she recognizes that the social
and cultural constructs of employment and parenting roles that rest
upon the gender division would not necessarily change the relation
93. O'DONOVAN, supra note 28, at 3 (acknowledging and discussing other legal
definitions of public and private).
94. O'DONOVAN, supra note 28, at 8.
95. O'DONOVAN, supra note 28, at 180; see also Williams, Selfless Women,
supra note 44, at 1565 n.22.
96. See Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 111-12, 118-19; Olsen,
Family and Market, supra note 28, at 1499.
97. See Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 110-12; Olsen, Family and
Market, supra note 28, at 1578; see also PATEMAN, supra note 28, at 10-13.
98. Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 111.
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between work and family. Nor would they necessarily alter the content
of parenting or employment roles. This is because, as Dowd notes,
workplace structure is not solely a consequence of gender but also
reflects hierarchies of class and race, the economic and organizational
consequences of a post-industrialist advanced capitalist system, and
fundamental concepts of the individual, family and community, and
their interrelationship with respect to children. Dowd wisely observes
that if we stop at gender, we will merely reconstruct gender and
reallocate roles, rather than questioning the content of the roles and
the structure within which they operate. 99 Dowd concludes that society
should prioritize neither work nor family, public nor private, but
rather should work to restructure the relation between the two.1°°
So, while gender is a primary determinant, it is not the sole
determinant of the existing public-private dichotomy within law. Be-
yond that, however, because the public-private division in law is not
strictly a gender issue, an adequate solution to the problems facing
women requires that additional issues be addressed in each of these
spheres, and that leaves us not far beyond the starting point. Still,
the public-private doctrine is useful at the point where some theorists
conclude that the distinction between the two spheres should be
obliterated so that strategies capable of empowering women and of
transforming the domestic and public lives of both women and men
can be formulated and, eventually, render these concepts unrepre-
sentative or, ultimately, redundant. 101
VI. STANDPom/PosmoNAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Several of the methodologies previously discussed have touched
upon epistemological issues, implicitly or explicitly expressing doubt
about the purported objectivity of traditional jurisprudence. This is
reflected in the style of consciousness raising advocated by Mac-
Kinnon,"02 as well as in Gilligan's thesis that men and women view
99. Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 111-12.
100. Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 111-12.
101. See Morgan, supra note 3, at 751 (discussing Olsen, Family and Market,
supra note 28, at 1566-67); Dowd, Work and Family, supra note 28, at 99-100,
110-12, 171-72.
102. As Catharine MacKinnon has written about the importance of epistemology
in her search for a feminist theory of the state,
Epistemology and politics emerged as two mutually enforcing sides of the
same unequal coin. A theory of the state which was at once social and
discrete, conceptual and applied, became possible as the state was seen to
participate in the sexual politics of male dominance by enforcing its
epistemology through law.




the world around them differently. Not all scholars have relegated
epistemology to a secondary issue. Some have focused almost exclu-
sively upon the matter of how knowledge is acquired within legal
frameworks and upon the import of this issue when admittedly seeking
to compel the law's responsiveness to women's needs and problems.
Generally speaking, a feminist epistemology is pro-experience and
anti-abstraction; it embraces subjectivity while rejecting dominant
ideology's claims to objectivity and universality. Among those feminist
legal scholars who have taken up the epistemological torch are Kathleen
Lahey, who also embraces consciousness raising as a means of pro-
ducing feminist theory. 0 3 Lahey has stated that feminist scholarship
is about "who may speak for other people and how the appropriation
of experience can be legitimated in the process of constructing knowl-
edge."'' 4 She sees consciousness raising as a way in which women
can generate "moments-of-'knowing' " when the unconscious struc-
tures of the mind are exposed to conscious structures."°1 However,
Lahey sees the process as an ongoing struggle, not one capable of
producing a "static state of precisely describable and perfectly com-
municable knowledge."' 6 She advocates an open-ended agenda, de-
veloped on a small scale with constant referral to women's actual
experiences. Lahey acknowledges the ambiguities and uncertainties
that characterize the project, but still prefers a modest scale to
MacKinnon's "Grand Theory" approach, which, at some stage, risks
abandonment of women's lived experience and opts for abstraction.' °1
Others, in the MacKinnon mold, have been more dogmatic about
their belief in consciousness raising as the method of feminism. These
writers have claimed consciousness raising as the badge that lends
validity to feminism because it allows women to take their personal
experiences to a political level.101
Ann Scales has also championed consciousness raising, though
her expectations of it are less ambitious. She has taken up the issue
of legal objectivity and the role that it plays in denying the reality
of women's experience. Similar to MacKinnon, Scales sees objectivity
103. Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra note 2, at 532.
104. Lahey, Until Women Themsleves, supra note 2, at 525.
105. Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra note 2, at 532.
106. Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra note 2, at 533.
107. Lahey, Until Women Themselves, supra note 2, at 536.
108. See, e.g., Wishik, To Question Everything, supra note 3, at 69 (hence the
feminist "motto" that "the personal is political").
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as a methodological stance that is conducive to objectification of
women. Also tracking MacKinnon, Scales advocates consciousness-
raising as methodology, insisting that experience is the most accurate
expression of truth and that it can provide law with "dramatic eye-
witness testimony."'' 9 However, it is on Gilligan's theories that Scales
builds when she argues that objectification is part of the masculine
consciousness. As a psychological phenomenon, it is therefore more
powerful than mere objectivity in the cultural sense because it celebrates
the masculine existence and consciousness." 10 Still, Scales does not
equate the rejection of objectivity with the rejection of standards and
"truths." In order to discern appropriate standards and truths, she
advocates continuous evaluation of results and continuous self-critique
of feminist jurisprudence, along with the current critique of traditional
jurisprudence. She rejects a priori abstract concepts that prevail re-
gardless of actual results.
Scales' result-orientation, however, lulls her into a familiar fem-
inist pitfall: the failure to account for heterogeneity of women. Her
theory presumes that certain "truths" are obtainable and that feminists
can reach consensus about what a good standard or "truth" is.
Katharine Bartlett has articulated an interesting modification of
the sort of "standpoint epistemology" represented by consciousness-
raising."' She advocates a method, which she calls positionality, that
admits its point of view but is not static and does not state gender
as the essential category of analysis. Bartlett's positionality concept
retains some of the knowledge-based-upon-experience approach. It
rejects, however, the dominant view of truth as external and objective,
opting instead for a "situated and partial" view of truth that emerges
from one's involvements and relationships." 2 We must seek to expand
our limited perspectives as individuals and to expand sources of identity
so that we avoid imposition of our (feminism's) point of view upon
the world and avoid making gender analysis essential. Bartlett believes
that from the critical process, certain increasingly final and fixed
truths will emerge. We must, however, be cautious not to try to
identify too many "truths," not to be too lax in our criticism of
the substance of such "truths," and not to defend them too dog-
matically. "'
109. Ann C. Scales, Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
L. J. 1373, 1402 (1986).
110. Id. at 1380-84.
111. See generally Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10.
112. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 880.
113. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 883-84.
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She summarizes the method:
Positionality is a stance from which a number of apparently
inconsistent feminist "truths" make sense. The positional stance
acknowledges the existence of empirical truths, values and knowl-
edge, and also their contingency. It thereby provides a basis for
feminist commitment and political action, but views these com-
mitments as provisional and subject to further critical evaluation
and revision.' 4
Bartlett seems to be trying to overcome one of the recurring
paradoxes of feminist jurisprudence and methodology: The conflict
between an epistemology that seeks to accommodate, validate, and
affirm every individual woman's experience while also seeking some
common ground-some common "truths"-upon which to construct
a new jurisprudence that accounts for their experience(s). She evi-
dently believes that a positional methodology can reconcile the ap-
parent contradiction between the value in recognizing diversity and
the need to attempt a transcension of that diversity."' In this sense,
I believe Bartlett's work signals a more mature feminist jurisprudence.
Gone are the essentialism, dogmatism, and absolutism of some earlier
works, perhaps to be replaced by a method that recognizes the
importance of gender, while also acknowledging that its significance
may vary from one legal context to another and also may shift over
time and from one legal system to another. The test of Bartlett's
methodology may now be whether law as a discipline is capable of
sufficient flexibility and responsiveness to appreciate and integrate
such complex and transient viewpoints.
VII. REALISM, SOCIETY AND LAW
The proponent of a different methodology, which she has labeled
"women's law," is Norwegian lawyer andaucademiciain, -r, ",.ac"
Dahl. 1 6 Although her analysis is not generated from the context of
law or the state and does not address issues of power, Stang Dahl
speaks in terms of a women's justice that will evolve, eventually
permeating law at the levels where she perceives law operating in
women's lives-primarily in the administrative and regulatory spheres.
She argues that the way to modify the existing law is to focus upon
114. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 880.
115. See Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 885.
116. See generally DAHL, WOMEN's LAW, supra note 30; Dahl, Taking Women
as a Starting Point, supra note 30.
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legislation and legal practice, bringing to bear methods of social
science in their formulation." 7
This approach to feminist jurisprudence, like the method of
consciousness-raising discussed above, is realist in methodology and
nature, presuming that the basis of the critique must be women's
lived experience. However, unlike those frameworks for analysis
focused on consciousness-raising as a means of formulating a feminist
agenda, this approach commences at the point where women are
not necessarily where feminists are. It is content with women's
consciousness. From this starting point, Stang Dahl argues that
women's concerns and needs should inform the development of new
areas of law or at least the reclassification of existing categories,
including birth law, paid-work law, housewives' law, and money
law." 8 Stang Dahl assumes the existence of a consensus that supports
her moral stance, one that focuses upon freedom, equality, dignity,
integrity, self-determination, and self-realization for women." 9
Stang Dahl only cursorily addresses the meaning of such terms
as "women" and "experience," seeming thereby to ignore their
complexity. She assumes that some unifying women's experience can
be discovered and that "women" is a concrete, knowable category.
Implicitly, then, she ignores the heterogeneity of the group.
Stang Dahl offers no apology for the presence of women-centered
policy considerations at the heart of women's law. In fact, she
recognizes the value of exchange between the feminist political stance
and women's studies as a science, as the former informs the direction
of the latter. Unlike most other feminist jurisprudential thinkers,
however, she expresses faith in a true distinction between the two,
stating that science's primary mission is to seek knowledge and
understanding, which in turn influences the women's polemic.
VIII. SOCIAL INJURY/HARM APPROACH
Several feminist legal writers-including MacKinnon,120 Wishik, 121
117. Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point, supra note 30, at 240-41.
118. Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point, supra note 30, at 242.
119. Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point, supra note 30, at 244-45.
120. See MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 27, at 195-214 (in pornography
context).
121. See generally Wishik, To Question Everything, supra note 3.
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West, '22 and Matsuda' 21-have touched on or utilized the social injury
or harm approach in their work. Working to some extent within
orthodox legal concepts, this method still challenges the primacy of
legal liberalism's rights-based analysis, shifting the emphasis to social
injury or harms which may occur when some members of society
exercise their "rights." One example of this analysis may be seen
in MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment, activity that is now
recognized as a harm within the U.S. civil rights laws.'2 4 This strategy
is increasingly applied in the context of free speech, as women and
other groups seek to establish and have legally recognized the harm
that may be caused to women when someone exercises his or her
constitutional right to free speech. 25
Professor Adrian Howe has also focused on the social injury
approach, articulating a theory of social injury originating in that
concept's use in criminology; but Howe has excised the theory from
that context and developed it into one that illustrates its relevance
to women. 2 6 Howe suggests an analytical privilege for the "concept
of social injury-in particular, the concept of gender-specific injury-
within feminist legal theory and, ultimately, legal discourse.' 127 As
Howe notes, once we have decided that the law is an appropriate
arena for change, we need to speak in legally cognizable, legally
122. West has argued that the law generally recognizes harms to women only
when they are analogous to harms which deprive a right that is comprehensible
to masculine liberal jurisprudence. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note
12, at 58-59.
123. See Matsuda, Considering the Victim's Story, supra note 31; Mari Matsuda,
Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Per-
spectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFF. L. Rzv. 337 (1988) [hereinafter Matsuda,
Language as Violence].
124. See generally MAcKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 27, at 103-
16.
Mark Kelman, a well-known scholar within the American Critical Legal Studies
movement, has commented upon the harm concept in this context.
A woman may ultimately be just as abused and exploited by the sexual
harasser as the rapist; the fact that the sexual harasser so closely resembles
the. boss in his ordinary mode . . . should ultimately be used by radicals
to undermine the legitimacy of power, not to defend harassers as obviously
noncriminal,
Mark Kelman, Criminal Law: The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence, in
THE POLITics OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982).
125. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); see also
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 27, at 127-213 (discussing harm in
context of pornography); Matsuda, Considering the Victim's Story, supra note 31
(extremist/sexist speech context); Matsuda, Language as Violence, supra note 123
(group defamation context).
126. Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited, supra note 3.
127. Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited, supra note 3, at 432.
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actionable terms.' 28 Howe advocates the identification and politici-
zation of "hidden injuries" that occur in our gender-ordered society 29
and concludes that redress for such gender-specific injuries must be
provided in any valid jurisprudence of social justice. 30
While Howe's work is helpful and pragmatic in its utilization
of traditional legal concepts, this may also be one of its disadvan-
tages. Howe's theory may go only part of the way in the feminist
jurisprudence attempt to improve women's situation within law and
by means of law. This is because identifying a social injury is not
the same as establishing a legally cognizable one. Just because a
harm is identified does not guarantee legal recognition of its causal
link to the objectionable activities that feminists believe should be
restricted or prohibited. 3' Furthermore, unless the law deems a harm
or injury sufficiently serious, it is highly unlikely that exercise of
the "right" from which the harm results will be circumscribed by
law. Man-made law has typically attributed little import to women-
specific harms, and unless a radical overhaul occurs in the judiciary
and legislatures, this is unlikely to change.
Feminist work with the social-injury construct may, then, be
useful with regard to some issues and at some stages of the project.
As a strictly legal construct, 1 2 however, its usefulness is almost
certainly limited.
IX. CONCLUSION
Each of the approaches to feminist jurisprudence discussed above
has made valuable contributions to the development of a more
sophisticated discipline than perhaps could have been envisioned a
decade ago. While many commentators have focused on divisions
among various factions of feminists, they often have failed to realize
128. Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited, supra note 3, at 432.
129. Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited, supra note 3, at 433.
130. Howe, 'Social Injury' Revisited, supra note 3, at 434.
131. See generally Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and
the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 737.
132. Some writers, most notably Carol Smart, have long questioned whether the
law is the appropriate forum for change and would reject outright Howe's analysis.
See Smart, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 17-18; Smart, Feminism and
Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy, 14 INT'L J. OF SOC. OF L. 109
(1986); see also Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELos 79 (1986) (contemplating
whether "law deserves a privileged place in resolving conflict and ordering society").
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how the critique within feminism and feminist "theory" has generated
a net positive result. As feminist jurisprudence has matured, new
analyses have revealed not only the flaws in traditional jurisprudence,
but also the flaws in preceding feminist theories. As a particular
new analysis has rendered aspects of a previous one obsolete and
revealed its ambiguities and contradictions, feminist jurisprudence
has been refined and has thus gained strength as a critique of the
dominant ideology.
Several transitions from one analysis to another are illustrative
of this regenerative phenomenon. Although the "women and the
law" approach with which the movement commenced has been much
maligned, its import to the early development of feminist jurispru-
dence can hardly be overstated. Without this initial step to raise
women's visibility and provoke discussion about equality issues, the
dead-end of the sameness-difference debate would not have been so
quickly exposed. Moreover, absent the frustration evoked by that
debate, scholars such as MacKinnon and Rhode may not have
developed their dominance/disadvantage theses. Just as a gendered
analysis revealed the historical inappropriateness-and imminent ob-
solescence-of law's public-private dichotomy, recent commentators
such as Joan Williams and Katharine Bartlett are foretelling the
coming redundancy of a gendered analysis."3 The critiques of mi-
nority and lesbian feminists have revealed the danger of establishing
gender as the essential situs of oppression, while also illustrating
the real need for inclusion. 34 Similarly, the false-consciousness dif-
ficulty with MacKinnon's meta-narrative is exposed by other fem-
inists' recognition of women's heterogeneity and corresponding variety
of lived experiences. On the other hand, what would unify women
sufficiently to build any theory without MacKinnon's identification
of and exposition about the common denominator that sex repre-
sents?
Thus, feminist jurisprudence has evolved through a series of
133. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing standpoint epis-
temology and positionality).
134. See generally, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, Wisc. WOMEN'S L.
REV. 536 (1989); Cain, Grounding the Theories, supra note 2; Cherise Cox, Anything
Less is Not Feminism: Racial Difference and the W.M. W.M., 1 LAW & CRITIQUE
237 (1990); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory,
12 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 115 (1989); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the




transitions, justs as it should and will continue to do. A vigilantly
self-critical stance should be maintained as the discipline enters its
next phase. Feminist jurisprudence should remain the object of efforts
to "reappraise, deconstruct, and transform,"' 3 just as it makes
traditional jurisprudence the object of its reappraisal, deconstruction,
and transformation.
The gender issue is indeed important, and it has been ignored
for too long. But, what will be the end result of developing a
feminist jurisprudence that takes into account solely this factor? If
knowledge from a feminist standpoint obscures or precludes knowl-
edge from a working-class or racial minority standpoint, 36 how can
we whole-heartedly embrace it as the new norm we have sought?
Still, "feminists must use presently understandable categories, even
while maintaining a critical posture toward their use," the dichot-
omies they represent, 3 7 and the potentiality of a counter-productive
essentialism. While it is troubling to offer legal remedies based upon
the very categories that have contributed to the harm being redressed,
it would be imprudent wholly to reject such categories now, when
we've come only so far.
Joan Williams has argued that our goal is not necessarily gender-
neutrality. Rather, it is to de-institutionalize gender.' 3 For if we
advocate gender neutrality (or gender difference) across the board,
we risk leaving women in a worse position than they previously
experienced. Thus, the importance of contextual examination becomes
apparent. Within contextual analysis, political and social conditions
of place and time are necessary considerations, 3 9 for only through
looking to the realities of women's lives at a given moment can we
determine standards and truths and, in turn, formulate responsive
rules. Even if these standards, truths, and rules are admittedly
tentative and partial, we may feel some confidence in them as the
best solution at that moment.
Perhaps it is the appropriate destiny of feminist jurisprudence
to continue to function as critique rather than to form a new
normative jurisprudence. As Deborah Rhode has written, "our anal-
135. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 887.
136. See Maureen Cain, Realism, Feminism, Methodology, and Law, 14 INT'L
J. oF Soc. OF L. 255 (1986).
137. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 10, at 835.
138. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note 19, at 836-41 (citing Alison
Jagger, On Sexual Equality, 84 ETEHCS 275, 276 (1975)).
139. See generally Suzanne Gibson, Continental Drift: The Question of Context
in Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 LAW & CRTIQUE 173 (1990) (discussing the extent to
which feminist legal theories may be traded across jurisdictions).
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ysis can become more self-critical about the partiality of our un-
derstandings and more explicit about the values underlying them."'
' 4
For eventually, when women's views, concerns, and experiences have
been recognized by and integrated into mainstream legal philosophy,
the notion of a feminist jurisprudence will have been rendered
redundant.
140. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 18, at 320.
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